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1 Introduction
The last financial crisis and the large increase of public debt in the US and within EMU countries,
that have been observed during the last four years, have generated a revival of the debate on
balanced-budget fiscal policies. The adoption of a “golden rule” is now seen as a solution to ensure
government debt sustainability and to prevent macroeconomic instability of the kind observed
recently in most OECD countries.
But, as shown by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe [21], balanced budgets may on the contrary lead to
indeterminacy, and thus inducing beliefs-driven aggregate fluctuations. Using labor income taxes
under a balanced-budget rule, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe have proved that locally indeterminate
equilibria arise for empirically plausible tax rates. Such strong conclusions have been weakened
by Giannitsarou [11] who considers instead consumption taxes still under a balanced-budget
rule. She shows that contrary to labor income taxes, local indeterminacy cannot occur. She then
suggests that consumption taxation must be preferred to labor income taxation if the government
has a stabilization target for public policies.1 However, the main limitation of this result is that
Giannitsarou [11] assumes log-linear preferences in consumption. Using instead a Greenwood-
Hercovitz-Huffman [10] (GHH) utility function characterized by no-income effect, Nourry et al.
[19] prove that expectations-driven fluctuations may still occur under large enough consumption
tax rates which are empirically plausible for European countries provided government spendings
are sufficiently counter-cyclical.2
The basic intuition for this result is the following: If households expect a higher future con-
sumption tax rate, they will reduce their future labor supply through a substitution effect. But,
households also expect to decrease their future consumption which increases labor at equilib-
rium through an income effect. If this last effect is dominated by the first one, which is obviously
satisfied with GHH preferences, a higher expected consumption tax rate implies a lower labor
supply which reduces the real interest rate and has a negative effect on current investment. Need-
ing less income today, households work less and decrease their consumption. This generates a
beliefs-driven increase of the current consumption tax rate in order to match the balanced-budget
rule.
The existence of local indeterminacy in an aggregate model is then based on the effect of
consumption taxes on the trade-off between consumption and leisure. In two-sector models,
there is, beside this one, an additional mechanism that relies on the impact of the tax rate
on the relative price between consumption and investment goods.3 The basic intuition is the
following: The expectation of an increase in the consumption tax rate yields a lower level of
production of goods as a response to the decrease of private consumption spendings. Then the
capital invested in the current period mechanically decreases, and so does the labor supply. As
the agents income is lower, they consume less, and the current consumption tax increases to
match the balanced budget rule.
The aim of this paper is to show that this new mechanism alone is sufficient to generate local
indeterminacy even in cases in which it is ruled out within aggregate models. We will then prove
1See also Saïdi [20] who shows that even with labor income taxes, determinacy of the equilibrium trajectory
is generically preserved for a non-empty range of initial values of the capital stock.
2Lane [14] shows that most OECD countries are characterized by counter-cyclical government spendings.
3See also Yano [25] and Bond et al. [7] for recent analysis of two-sector optimal growth models in a closed
economy or with trade.
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that considering a two-sector economy allows to extend the plausibility of expectations-driven
fluctuations based on consumption taxation.
This claim is based on the conclusions derived in the literature dealing with local indeter-
minacy generated by external effects in production. As initially established by Benhabib and
Farmer [2], in one-sector models local indeterminacy requires strongly unrealistic increasing so-
cial returns to scale based on large aggregate capital and labor externalities. On the contrary,
as shown in Benhabib and Farmer [3] or Benhabib and Nishimura [5], in two-sector models with
mild sector-specific externalities, local indeterminacy becomes compatible with weakly increasing
or even constant social returns. Capital and, more importantly, labor allocations across sectors,
that are generated through Rybczynski and Stolper-Samuelson effects, allow indeed to get locally
indeterminate equilibria under plausible parameterizations.
In this paper, we follow Benhabib and Nishimura [5] and consider a two-sector economy with
Cobb-Douglas sectoral technolgies. We assume that the households’ preferences are characterized
by some utility function homogeneous of degree one. This specification is again justified by recent
conclusions on the existence of indeterminacy in two-sector models with externalities. Nishimura
and Venditti [18] prove indeed that homogenous preferences provide large degrees of freedom to
get sunspot fluctuations under realistic parameters’ values. As in Nourry et al. [19] we finally
assume balanced-budget consumption taxes with government spendings that can be counter-
cyclical, constant or weakly pro-cyclical.
We show that expectations-driven fluctuations can arise for any capital intensity difference
across sectors provided the consumption tax rate is not too low and the wage elasticity of the
labor supply is low enough. Moreover, the lower bound of the tax rate is decreasing with the
degree of counter-cyclicality of government spendings. We also provide a numerical illustration
based on a CES specification of preferences. Under a standard parameterization of the model
compatible with quarterly data, we show that the lower bound of the consumption tax rate
above which local indeterminacy arises is less than 5%. These results show that consumption
taxation in two-sector models may explain business-cycle fluctuations based on beliefs in all
OECD countries, including the US.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present the model in the next section. In
Section 3, we discuss the existence of a normalized steady state. In Section 4, we provide our
main conditions for the existence of aggregate instability and endogenous sunspot fluctuations
under linear homogenous preferences, with a special emphasis on the CES specification. Section
5 gives economic interpretations of our results. Some concluding remarks are provided in Section
6, and all the proofs are gathered in a final Appendix.
2 The model
2.1 The production structure
We consider an economy producing a consumption good y0 and a capital good y1. Each good is
produced by capital kj and labor lj, j = 0, 1, through a Cobb-Douglas production function. The
representative firm in each industry indeed faces the following technology:
y0 = k
α
0 l
1−α
0 , y1 = k
β
1 l
1−β
1 (1)
2
with α, β ∈ (0, 1). Each firm maximizes its profit given the price of the consumption good p0,
the price of the investment (capital) good p1, the rental rate of capital w1 and the wage rate w0.
The first order conditions subject to the private technologies (1) give
k0/y0 = p0α/w1 ≡ a10(w1, p0), l0/y0 = p0(1− α)/w0 ≡ a00(w0, p0)
k1/y1 = p1β/w1 ≡ a11(w1, p1), l1/y1 = p1(1− β)/w0 ≡ a01(w0, p1)
(2)
We call aij the input coefficients.
Considering that total labor is given by ℓ = l0 + l1, and the total stock of capital is given by
k = k0 + k1, the factor market clearing equation is directly obtained from the input coefficients
as defined by (2). Denoting x = (ℓ, k)′, y = (y0, y1)
′ and A(w, p) = [aij(wi, pj)], we get
A(w, p)y = x (3)
From (2), substituting the expressions of (kj , lj), j = 0, 1, into the production functions
(1) and solving with respect to pj gives the factor-price frontier, which provides a relationship
between input prices and output prices. Denoting p = (p0, p1)
′ and w = (w0, w1)
′, we get
p = A′(w, p)w (4)
From now on, we choose the consumption good as the numeraire, i.e. p0 = 1. It follows from
(3) and (4) that at the equilibrium, the wage rate and the rental rate are functions of the price
of the capital good only, i.e. wi = wi(p1), i = 0, 1, while outputs are functions of the capital
stock, total labor and the price of the capital good, yj = y˜j(k, ℓ, p1), j = 0, 1.
Profit maximization in both sectors gives demands for capital and labor as linear homogeneous
functions of the capital stock, the output of the investment good and total labor, namely k˜j =
kj(k, y1, ℓ), l˜j = lj(k, y1, ℓ) j = 0, 1. The production frontier is then
y0 = T (k, y1, ℓ) = k˜
α
0 l˜
1−α
0 (5)
Note that T (k, y1, ℓ) is a linear homogeneous function. From the envelope theorem we get
w1 = T1(x1, y1, ℓ), p1 = −T2(x1, y1, ℓ) and w0 = T3(x1, y1, ℓ).
2.2 Government
In our simple neoclassical economy, the only source of government revenue is a consumption tax
supported by the households, government purchases are variable, the initial shock of public debt
is zero, and the government is subject to a balanced-budget requirement. The endogenous level
of public spending G(t) satisfies the following resource constraint
c(t) + G(t) = y0(t) = T (k(t), y1(t), ℓ(t)) (6)
Given the level of government income Ω (c(t)) derived from the tax function τ(t), the government
expenditures G(t) also satisfy the following balanced-budget rule:
G(t) = Ω (c(t)) = τ(t)c(t) (7)
In the following we will consider a sufficiently general formulation of public expenditures G(t)
that encompasses the case of Giannitsarou [11], in which the government faces an exogenous
stream of constant expenditure G(t) = G that is financed by levying proportional taxes on
consumption. Our formulation allows indeed for counter or pro-cyclical government spendings.
We choose consumption c as a proxy of the measure of the business cycle and we assume that
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public spending is a function of c, namely G(t) ≡ G(c(t)).A word of caution is necessary here.
Usually government spendings are expressed as a function of output. But since consumption is
almost perfectly correlated with output, our formulation is not restrictive. Using our notations
we get
G(c(t)) = Ω(c(t)) = τ(t)c(t) ⇔ τ(t) = τ(c(t)) = G(c(t))/c(t) (8)
This expression endogenously determines the level of the consumption tax rate. The tax function
is assumed to have the following properties:
Assumption 1. τ (c): [0,+∞)→ [0,+∞) is continuous, and C1 on (0,+∞).
Let us then denote:
η ≡ G′(c)c/G(c)
We will say that public expenditures are counter(pro)-cyclical when η < 0 (η > 0). The Giannit-
sarou’s case of constant government spending is obtained when η = 0. Using the balanced-budget
rule, let us introduce the following elasticity:
ζ ≡ τ
′(c)c
1+τ(c) =
τ(η−1)
1+τ
(9)
The tax rate τ(c) = G(c)/c is therefore counter-cyclical for ζ < 0, or η < 1, pro-cyclical for
ζ > 0, or η > 1, and constant for ζ = 0, or η = 1. In the following, the most important
parameter will be the elasticity of the tax rate ζ. The elasticity of government spendings η will
be used only as a way to increase or decrease the value of ζ. Note that even when government
spendings are pro-cyclical with η ∈ (0, 1), the consumption tax rate remains counter-cyclical
with ζ < 0. We further assume that the public expenditures G(t) neither affect the consumers’
preferences nor the production function. In the following, we will mainly focus on a counter-
cyclical consumption tax rate since, as shown by Lane [14], government spendings in most OECD
countries are counter-cyclical (η < 0).
2.3 Households’ behavior
The economy is populated by a large number of identical infinitely-lived agents. We assume
without loss of generality that the total population is constant and normalized to one. At each
period a representative agent supplies elastically an amount of labor ℓ ∈ (0, ℓ¯), with ℓ¯ > 1 his
time endowment. He derives utility from consumption c and leisure L = ℓ¯ − ℓ according to a
function U(c,L/B), where B > 0 is a scaling parameter,4 which satisfies:
Assumption 2. U(c,L/B) is Cr over R++ × (0, ℓ¯) for r ≥ 2, increasing in each argument,
concave and homogeneous of degree 1. Moreover, for all (c,X) ∈ R2++,
U12(c,X)X
U1(c,X)
− U22(c,X)XU2(c,X) 6= 1,
limX→0 U2(c,X)/U1(c,X) = +∞ and limX→+∞ U2(c,X)/U1(c,X) = 0.
Consumption and leisure are then normal goods. Building on the homogeneity of degree 1,
we introduce the share of consumption within total utility θ(c,L/B) ∈ (0, 1) defined as follows:5
θ(c,L/B) = U1(c,L/B)cU(c,L/B)
(10)
4The constant B is used to prove the existence of a normalized steady state which remains invariant with
respect to preference parameters such that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption or the
wage elasticity of the labor supply.
5The share of leisure within total utility is similarly defined as 1− θ(c,L/B) ∈ (0, 1).
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the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure
φ(c,L/B) =
U2(cB/L,1)/U1(cB/L,1)
cB/L
∂(U2(cB/L,1)/U1(cB/L,1))
∂(cB/L)
(11)
and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption
ǫcc = −
U1(c,L/B)
U11(c,L/B)c
(12)
that will be useful in the rest of the analysis. It is worth noting that φ is linked with the elasticity
ǫcc through the share θ: φ = (1− θ)ǫcc.
A possible illustration of such an utility function is provided by the following CES formulation
U(c,L/B) =
[
νc−ψ + (1− ν)(L/B)−ψ
]−1/ψ
(13)
with ν ∈ (0, 1) and ψ > −1. In this case we have
θ(c,L/B) = ν
ν+(1−ν)(Bc/L)ψ
(14)
and the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure is constant and given by
φ = 1/(1 + ψ).
We assume that the representative household considers as given the tax rate on consumption.
The intertemporal optimization problem of the representative household is given by:
max
{c(t),y1(t),ℓ(t)}
∫ +∞
0
U(c(t), (ℓ¯ − ℓ(t))/B)e−ρtdt
s.t. (1 + τ(c¯(t)))c(t) = T (k(t), y1(t), ℓ(t))
k˙(t) = y1(t)− δk(t)
k(0) and τ(c¯(t)) given
(15)
where ρ ≥ 0 is the discount rate and δ > 0 the depreciation rate of the capital stock.
2.4 Intertemporal equilibrium
The modified Hamiltonian in current value is given by:
H = U(c(t), (ℓ¯ − ℓ(t))/B) + λ(t) [T (k(t), y1(t), ℓ(t)) − (1 + τ(c¯(t)))c(t)]
+ q1(t) [y1(t)− δk(t)]
with q1(t) the co-state variable which corresponds to the utility price of the capital good in current
value and λ(t) the Lagrange multiplier associated with the Government budget constraint. The
first order conditions of problem (15) are given by the following equations:
U1(c(t), (ℓ¯ − ℓ(t))/B) = λ(t)(1 + τ(c(t))) (16)
q1(t) = p1(t)λ(t) (17)
U2(c(t), (ℓ¯ − ℓ(t))/B)/B = w0λ(t) (18)
k˙(t) = y1(t)− δk(t) (19)
q˙1(t) = (δ + ρ)q1(t)− w1(t)λ(t) (20)
As shown in Section 2.1, we have wi = wi(p1), i = 0, 1, y1 = y˜1(k, ℓ, p1) and y0 = y˜0(k, ℓ, p1) =
T (k, y˜1(k, ℓ, p1), ℓ). Therefore, solving equation (18) describing the labor-leisure trade-off at the
equilibrium, we express the labor supply as a function of the capital stock and the output price,
ℓ = ℓ(k, p1). Then, we get y0 = y0(k, p1) ≡ y˜0(k, ℓ(k, p1), p1), y1 = y1(k, p1) ≡ y˜1(k, ℓ(k, p1), p1)
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and thus c(1 + τ(c)) = y0(k, p1). This last equation allows therefore to express consumption as
c = c(k, p1).
Let us introduce the following additional elasticities:6
ǫℓc ≡ −
U2(c,L/B)
U21(c,L/B)c
= − (1−θ)ǫccθ , ǫcℓ ≡ −
U1(c,L/B)B
U12(c,L/B)ℓ
= Φǫℓc = −
(1−θ)Φǫcc
θ ,
ǫℓℓ ≡ −
U2(c,L/B)B
U22(c,L/B)ℓ
= (1−θ)
2Φǫcc
θ2
(21)
with Φ = [δ(1 − β) + ρ]/[δ(1 − β) + ρ(1 − α)]. Note that ǫℓℓ provides the wage elasticity of the
labor supply.
Considering (16)-(20), the equations of motion are finally derived as
k˙ = y1(k, p1)− δk
p˙1 =
(δ+ρ)p1−w1(p1)+
h“
ζ+ 1
ǫcc
”
p1
c
∂c
∂k
−
p1
ǫcℓℓ
∂ℓ
∂k
i
(y1(k,p1)−δk)
E(k,p1)
(22)
with
E(k, p1) = 1−
[(
ζ + 1ǫcc
)
p1
c
∂c
∂p1
− p1ǫcℓℓ
∂ℓ
∂p1
]
(23)
Any solution {k(t), p1(t)}t≥0 that satisfies the transversality condition
lim
t→+∞
e−ρtU1(c(t),(ℓ¯−ℓ(t))/B)p1(t)k(t)
(1+τ(c(t))) = 0 (24)
is called an equilibrium path.
3 Steady state and characteristic polynomial
3.1 A normalized steady state
A steady state of the dynamical system (22) is defined by a pair (k∗, p∗1) solution of
y1(k, p1) = δk, w1(p1) = (δ + ρ)p1 (25)
Let us denote κ = k/ℓ the capital/labor ratio.
Proposition 1. There exist unique values of κ∗ and p∗1 such that y1(ℓκ
∗, p∗1) = δℓκ
∗ and w1(p
∗
1) =
(δ + ρ)p∗1.
Proof : See Appendix 7.1.
However, given κ∗ and p∗1, we need to prove the existence of c, ℓ and k. Using the balanced-budget
rule (8), a steady state can be defined by a solution (c, ℓ) satisfying:
G(c) = Ω(c) = τc (26)
(1 + τ)c = ℓT (κ∗, δκ∗, 1) ≡ ℓT ∗ (27)
(1 + τ)U2(c, (ℓ¯ − ℓ)/B)
U1(c, (ℓ¯− ℓ)/B)B
= w0(p
∗
1) ≡ w
∗
0 (28)
We have shown previously that consumption can be expressed as c = c(k, p1) = c(ℓκ, p1). Sub-
stituting this expression in (28), we use the scaling parameter B > 0 in order to ensure the
existence of a normalized steady state (NSS in the sequel) such that ℓ∗ = 1. We have indeed:
(1+τ(c(κ∗,p∗1)))U2(c(κ
∗,p∗1)),(ℓ¯−1)/B)
U1(c(κ∗,p∗1)),(ℓ¯−1)/B)B
= w∗0 (29)
Using this expression together with Proposition 1 we can show:
6These expressions are derived from Lemma 1 in Appendix 7.3, U12 = −(c/L)U11 and U22 = (c/L)
2U11.
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Proposition 2. There exists a unique value B∗ solution of equation (29) such that when B = B∗,
(κ∗, p∗1, ℓ
∗), with κ∗, p∗1 as given by Proposition 1 and ℓ
∗ = 1, is a normalized steady state.
Proof : See Appendix 7.2.
Remark 1 : Using a continuity argument we derive from Proposition 2 that there exists an
intertemporal equilibrium for any initial capital stock k(0) in the neighborhood of κ∗.
3.2 Characteristic polynomial
Linearizing the dynamical system (22) around the NSS leads to the characteristic polynomial
P(λ) = λ2 − T λ+D (30)
with
D =
“
∂y1
∂k
−δ
”“
δ+ρ−
∂w1
∂p1
”
E(k∗,p∗1)
T =
∂y1
∂k
+ρ−
∂w1
∂p1
+
h“
ζ+ 1
ǫcc
”
p1
c
∂c
∂k
−
p1
ǫcℓℓ
∂ℓ
∂k
i
∂y1
∂p1
−
h“
ζ+ 1
ǫcc
”
p1
c
∂c
∂p1
−
p1
ǫcℓℓ
∂ℓ
∂p1
i“
∂y1
∂k
−δ
”
E(k∗,p∗1)
(31)
Most of these partial derivatives are functions of ζ, ǫcc, ǫcℓ, ǫℓc and ǫℓℓ. The role of ǫℓc and ǫℓℓ
occurs through the presence of endogenous labor but remains implicit at that stage because of
our methodology to derive the dynamical system (22) from the first order conditions (16)-(20).
Any solution of (22) that converges to the NSS satisfies the transversality condition (24)
and is an equilibrium. Therefore, given k(0), if there is more than one initial price p1(0) in the
stable manifold of the NSS, the equilibrium path from k(0) will not be unique. In particular, if
(30) has two roots with negative real parts, there will be a continuum of converging paths and
thus a continuum of equilibria. The NSS is locally indeterminate and there exist expectation-
driven endogenous fluctuations. Local indeterminacy requires therefore that D > 0 and T < 0.
Obviously saddle-point stability is obtained when D < 0 while total instability holds (with both
eigenvalues having positive real parts) if D > 0 and T > 0. In this last case, there is no
equilibrium. In the following, we will focus on a locally indeterminate equilibrium and we will
refer to the destabilizing effect of the tax rate which generates expectation-driven fluctuations.
4 Local indeterminacy with consumption taxes
Our aim is to study the existence of local indeterminacy, i.e. business-cycle fluctuations based
on self-fulfilling prophecies. As initiated by Benhabib and Nishimura [4, 5], the analysis in two-
sector models is based on capital intensity differences across sectors. From the input coefficients
defined in Section 2.1, we derive that the consumption (investment) good is capital intensive
when β − α < (>)0.
4.1 Main result
It is well-known that if consumption taxes are set equal to zero, the NSS is saddle-point stable for
any capital intensity difference. We show in the following that with balanced-budget consumption
taxation, aggregate instability and sunspot fluctuations easily arise in a standard two-sector
optimal growth model. In the rest of the analysis, in order to avoid unrealistic configurations,
we assume that ζ > −1, or equivalently η > −1/τ .
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Proposition 3. Under Assumptions 1-2, for any α, β ∈ (0, 1), there exist θ ∈ (0, 1) and τ > 0
such that the NSS is locally indeterminate if θ ∈ (θ, 1), τ > τ and η ∈ (−1/τ, 1).
Proof : See Appendix 7.3.
Considering the expression of the lower bound τ as given in Appendix 7.3, we easily derive
that ∂τ/∂η > 0. It follows that the more counter-cyclical government spendings are, the lower
the consumption tax rate can be for the existence of local indeterminacy.
A striking property of our result is that sunspot fluctuations can arise for any capital inten-
sity difference, even in the limit case with identical technologies in the two sectors, i.e. α = β.
This conclusion can be easily explained. Actually, a two-sector model with identical technolo-
gies across sectors producing therefore identical goods is not equivalent to a standard one-sector
model. As suggested by the contributions of Benhabib and Farmer [2, 3] in models with pro-
ductive externalities, the main difference between these two formulations is that in two-sector
models, even with symmetric technologies, there exist capital and labor allocations across sec-
tors, that are generated through Rybczynski and Stolper-Samuelson effects and that may produce
expectation-driven fluctuations even when these are ruled-out in aggregate models. The same
type of mechanism also arises in our model through counter-cyclical consumption taxes.
It is also worth pointing out that a not too low consumption tax rate and a low enough
wage elasticity of the labor supply ǫℓℓ appear as necessary conditions for local indeterminacy.
Moreover, sunspot fluctuations compatible with constant government spendings, i.e. η = 0.
Finally, by adjusting the elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure, sunspot
fluctuations can arise with any value for the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consump-
tion. We show in the following section that our conclusions are compatible with empirically
plausible values of these structural parameters.
Remark 2 : It can be shown that even in the case of additively separable preferences such
that
U(c,L/B) = c
1−σ
1−σ −
[(ℓ¯−L)/B]1+χ
(1+χ)
(32)
with σ, χ ≥ 0, local indeterminacy arises for some range of tax rates if the wage elasticity of
labor is low and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption is larger than 1,
although saddle-point stability always prevails in an aggregate models (see Giannitsarou [11]
and Nourry et al. [19]). As explained above, this result follows from the existence of capital and
labor allocations across sectors in two-sector models.7
4.2 A CES illustration
Let us consider the CES specification as given by (13). Within all the parameters involved in
our analysis, two are of particular importance. On the one hand, the elasticity of the aggregate
labor supply is shown to be significantly lower than one. Most econometric analysis available in
the literature conclude indeed that the wage elasticity of labor belongs to (0, 0.5) for men and
to (0.5, 1) for women (see Blundell and MaCurdy [6]). On the other hand, while the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption is usually shown to be low, recent estimates provide
divergent views. In a first set of contributions, Campbell [8] and Kocherlakota [13] suggest the
7It can be shown that with GHH preferences local indeterminacy also occurs for any capital intensity difference
in our two-sector framework as in aggregate models (see Nourry et al. [19]).
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interval (0.2, 0.8). On the contrary, Mulligan [17], Vissing-Jorgensen [23] and Vissing-Jorgensen
and Attanasio [24] repeatedly obtain estimates of this elasticity which are significantly larger
than one. More recently, Gruber [11] and Kapoor and Ravi [12] provide robust estimates in the
range (2, 3). According to these various empirical estimates, we focus on the following ranges
ǫcc ∈ (0.5, 2.5) and ǫℓℓ ∈ (0, 1).
According to the consumption tax rates provided by Mendoza et al. [15, 16],8 we have the
following ranges for each OECD countries:
τ ∈ (0.05, 0.1) Australia, Japan, US, Switzerland
τ ∈ (0.1, 0.15) Canada, Italy, Spain
τ ∈ (0.15, 0.2) Belgium, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Portugal, UK
τ ∈ (0.2, 0.25) Austria, France, Iceland, Luxembourg, Sweden
τ > 0.25 Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway
Table 1: Consumption tax rates of OECD countries
Let us then consider parameters’ values that match quarterly data: δ = 2.5%, ρ = 0.04,
α = 0.33, β = 0.32.9 In the case of constant government spendings (η = 0) we find that the NSS
is locally indeterminate for all τ > τ , with τ depending on the value of ǫcc, if θ ∈ (0.72736, 1). Let
θ = 0.73 and assume first an elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption ǫcc = 0.5
in the range provided by Campbell [8] and Kocherlakota [13]. We conclude that τ ≈ 4.76%
and the corresponding wage elasticity of labor is ǫℓℓ = 0.089. Assuming now an elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in consumption ǫcc = 2.2 as recently suggested by Gruber [11] and
Kapoor and Ravi [12], we find that τ ≈ 4.34% and ǫℓℓ = 0.39.
10 In both cases, the lower bound
τ is compatible with the consumption tax rates of all OECD countries including the US and
Japan, as mentioned in Table 1.
This numerical exercise is based on a capital intensive consumption good sector, i.e. α > β.
It is worth pointing out that our results still hold in the configuration with a reverse capital
intensity difference, i.e. α < β. However, we can show that the lower bound of the tax rate,
above which local indeterminacy arises, satisfies ∂τ/∂(β − α) > 0. This means that if the
investment good is capital intensive, expectations-driven fluctuations occur for higher tax rates.
Considering the same basic parameters’ values but setting α = 0.32 and β = 0.33, we find indeed
slightly larger lower bounds such that τ = 7.26% when ǫcc = 0.5 and τ = 6.57% when ǫcc = 2.2.
Let us finally complete this exercise by discussing the value of η. Using annual data over the
interval 1960− 1998 for 22 OECD countries, Lane [14] provides some empirical estimates of the
elasticity of government expenditure with respect to output growth. Since consumption is almost
perfectly correlated with output, we then have an approximated measure of η. Lane shows that
in most OECD countries government spendings are counter-cyclical with η ∈ (−0.66, 0). Consid-
ering that the lower bound τ decreases with η, we conclude that the above results are reinforced
8Updated estimates up to 1996 are available online from the authors.
9In this parameterization the consumption good is slightly more capital intensive than the investment good.
This configuration appears to be the most plausible in the OECD countries over the last 40 years as shown by
Baxter [1] and Takahashi et al. [22].
10The values of ǫℓℓ in both illustrations belong to the lower ranges of estimated wage elasticities for men.
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when η becomes negative. We have then proved that with linear homogeneous preferences, aggre-
gate instability based on expectations-driven fluctuations can be generated by balanced-budget
consumption taxes under empirically plausible parameters’ configurations.
5 Economic interpretations
To simplify the exposition, we restrict our attention to a balanced-budget rule with constant
spendings (η = 0). Such a simplification is not restrictive. In Proposition 3 we focus indeed on
a counter-cyclical tax rate (ζ < 0) which is compatible, as shown by equation (9), with counter-
cyclical (η < 0), constant (η = 0) or pro-cyclical (η ∈ (0, 1)) government spendings. Actually,
the value of η only affects the size of the elasticity ζ of the tax rate.
As shown by Nourry et al. [19], in aggregate models if the utility function is characterized
by sufficiently larger substitution effects with respect to income effects, a higher expected con-
sumption tax rate implies a lower labor supply. This decrease of next period labor reduces the
real interest rate, which has a negative effect on current investment. Needing less income today,
households work less. This induces a lower consumption, and thus an increase of the current
consumption tax rate in order to match the balanced-budget rule. Therefore, expectations are
self-fulfilling.
When additively separable preferences, or linear homogeneous preferences with reasonable
parameters’ values are considered, income effects remain too large to allow for such a mechanism
and expectations-driven fluctuations are ruled out (see Giannitsarou [11] and Nourry et al. [19]).
On the contrary, with GHH preferences characterized by no income effect, local indeterminacy
easily arises under plausible parameterizations of the model (see Nourry et al. [19]).
In two-sector models, there exists an additional mechanism that can also explain the existence
of expectations-driven fluctuations even in the case of symmetric technologies across sectors. Let
us indeed assume that α = β. It can be easily shown that in this configuration, k0 = k1 = k/2,
l0 = l1 = ℓ/2, p1 = 1 and thus y0 = y1. The capital accumulation equation then becomes
k˙ = y1 − δk = y0 − δk = (1 + τ)c− δk (33)
Consider linear homogeneous preferences. Using the first order conditions (16) and (18) together
with (6)-(8) and (21), we get
dc
dτ
τ
c = −
τ
1+τ
(1−θ)2Φǫcc−θ
(1−θ)Φ−θ
It follows that if, as in Proposition 3, θ is close enough to 1, we derive
∂
∂τ (1 + τ)c < 0
Starting from some equilibrium at date t, assume that the agents expect a rise in the consumption
tax rate. We conclude from (33) that the productions of both goods have to decrease. The
corresponding lower investment level generates a lower labor supply and thus a decrease of the
real interest rate w1 which has a negative impact on current investment. Needing less income
today, households work less. The implied fall of consumption then induces an increase of the
current consumption tax rate in order to match the balanced-budget rule. The initial expectation
becomes self-fulfilling leading to another equilibrium. This additional mechanism, clearly based
on the property y0 = y1, explains why local indeterminacy may arise in a two-sector model with
symmetric technologies.
Consider finally the case of asymmetric technologies across sectors with α 6= β. The addi-
tional mechanism is now based on Stolper-Samuelson effects that can amplify or lower the above
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mentioned effects depending on the sign of the capital intensity difference. Assume first that
the consumption good is capital intensive, i.e. α > β. In this case we know that the relative
price of the investment good p is a decreasing function of the rental rate of capital w1. As pre-
viously, the expected rise in the consumption tax rate generates a decrease of the labor supply
and thus a fall of w1. But now, the Stolper-Samuelson effect implies an increase of p1 which
stimulates the production of the investment good but lowers the production of the consumption
good y0 = (1 + τ)c. This amplifies the decrease of the labor supply and thus the fall of the
real interest rate. Current investment is then negatively affected, leading to a fall of current
labor supply and consumption. All this results in a self-fulfilling increase of the consumption tax
rate in order to match the balanced-budget rule. As a consequence local indeterminacy becomes
compatible with lower tax rates as shown by the numerical exercise. Obviously, this overall effect
is opposite when the investment good sector is capital intensive, i.e. α < β and this explains
why local indeterminacy requires larger tax rates in this case.
6 Concluding comments
In this paper we precisely examine the impact of balanced-budget consumption taxes on the
existence of expectations-driven business cycles in two-sector economies. Contrary to the initial
conclusion of Giannitsarou [11], Nourry et al. [19] have recently proved that in aggregate growth
models, balanced-budget fiscal policy rules based on consumption taxation may generate aggre-
gate instability through self-fulfilling expectations when the utility function is characterized by
low enough income effects.
The main contribution of this paper is to prove that in a two-sector economy, there exists
an additional mechanism based on sectoral allocations of capital and labor that provides new
room for the occurrence of locally indeterminate equilibria. We prove indeed that for any sign of
the capital intensity difference expectations-driven fluctuations occur when the wage elasticity
of labor is low and the consumption tax rate is not too low. Moreover, under a standard param-
eterization of the model compatible with quarterly data, we show that the lower bound of the
consumption tax rate above which local indeterminacy arises is less than 5%. We then conclude
that consumption taxation in two-sector economies may explain business-cycle fluctuations based
on beliefs in all OECD countries, including the US.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Maximizing profit subject to the private technologies (1) gives the first order conditions
p0αy0/k0 = w1, p0(1− α)y0/l0 = w0
p1βy1/k1 = w1, p1(1− β)y1/l1 = w0
(34)
with p0 = 1. Considering the steady state with y1 = δk and w1 = (δ + ρ)p1, we get
k1 =
β
δ+ρδk (35)
Using the production function (1) for the investment good we derive
l1 =
(
β
δ+ρ
)− β
1−β
δk and thus k1l1 =
(
β
δ+ρ
) 1
1−β (36)
Finally we obtain from (34):
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α(1−β)
β(1−α) =
l1k0
k1l0
⇔ k0l0 =
α(1−β)
β(1−α)
(
β
δ+ρ
) 1
1−β (37)
Considering (36), (37) and l0 + l1 = ℓ, k = k0 + k1, we get
k∗ = ℓ
α(1−β)
β(1−α)
“
β
δ+ρ
” 1
1−β
1− βδ
δ+ρ
h
1−
α(1−β)
β(1−α)
i ≡ ℓκ∗ (38)
Equation (34) with (37) gives
w∗1 = α
(
α(1−β)
β(1−α)
)−(1−α) (
β
δ+ρ
)− 1−α
1−β
and w∗0 = w
∗
1
1−β
β
(
β
δ+ρ
) 1
1−β (39)
Considering then the fact that w1 = (δ + ρ)p1 implies
p∗1 =
α
δ+ρ
(
α(1−β)
β(1−α)
)−(1−α) (
β
δ+ρ
)− 1−α
1−β
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2
To establish the existence of the normalized steady state with ℓ∗ = 1, we have to prove the
existence and uniqueness of a solution B∗ of the following equation
Γ(B) ≡
(1+τ(c(κ∗,p∗1))))U2(c(κ
∗,p∗1)),(ℓ¯−1)/B)
U1(c(κ∗,p∗1)),(ℓ¯−1)/B)B
= w∗0
Under Assumption 2 we have limB→0 Γ(B) = 0, limB→+∞ Γ(B) = +∞ and Γ
′(B)B/Γ(B) 6= 0.
The existence and uniqueness of B∗ follow.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Let us first introduce a useful relationship between ǫℓc and ǫcℓ.
Lemma 1. Let Assumption 2 hold. Then at the steady state
ǫcℓ =
δ(1−β)+ρ
δ(1−β)+ρ(1−α) ǫℓc ≡ Φǫℓc (40)
Proof : Using the first order conditions (16) and (18), we get ǫcℓ = ǫℓc(c(1 + τ)/w0ℓ). At the
steady state we have (1 + τ)c = y0 = ℓT (κ, δκ, 1) ≡ ℓT and (34) implies w0 = (1− α)y0/l0 with
l0 = ℓ− l1. Considering then (38), the result follows.
We start by the computation of D and T using a general formulation for U(c,L/B). Consider
the expressions (31). We need to compute the following five derivatives: ∂c/∂k, ∂c/∂p1, ∂y1/∂k,
∂y1/∂p1 and ∂w1/∂p1. Let b = (a11a00−a10a01) = a00(β−α)/(δ+ρ)(1−α). Total differentiation
of the factor-price frontier (4) and the factor market clearing equation (3) gives:
dw1
dp1
= a00
b
(41)
dy0
dk
= −a01b +
a11
b
dℓ
dk
(42)
dy1
dk
= a00
b −
a10
b
dℓ
dk
(43)
dy1
dp1
=
a00ℓ∗(Z1+Z2)
bp∗1
− δℓ
∗κ∗
p∗1
− a10b
dℓ
dp1
(44)
dy0
dp1
=
−a01ℓ∗(Z1+Z2)
bp∗1
+ a11b
dℓ
dp1
(45)
with
Z1 =
κ∗(1−α)
β−α , Z2 =
a11α
a01(β−α)
(46)
Consider the constraint c(1 + τ(c)) = T (k, y1, ℓ(k, p1)) = y0(k, p1). Total differentiation gives:
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dc
dk
= dy0dk
1
(1+τ(c))(1+ζ) =
1
h(c)(1+ζ)
[
−a01b +
a11
b
dℓ
dk
]
(47)
dc
dp1
= dy0dp1
1
(1+τ(c))(1+ζ) =
1
h(c)(1+ζ)
[
−a01ℓ∗(Z1+Z2)
bp∗1
+ a11b
dℓ
dp1
]
(48)
We finally need to compute dℓ/dk and dℓ/dp1. Total differentiation of equation (28) gives:
dℓ
ℓ
(
1
ǫℓℓ
− 1ǫcℓ
)
= −dp1
[
dc
dp1
1
c
(
ζ + 1ǫcc −
1
ǫℓc
)
− 1w0
dw0
dp1
]
− dk dcdk
1
c
(
ζ + 1ǫcc −
1
ǫℓc
)
When dp1 = 0, using (47) we derive:
dℓ
dk =
a01
(1+ζ)bT∗
“
ζ+ 1
ǫcc
− 1
ǫℓc
”
1
ǫℓℓ
− 1
ǫcℓ
+
a11
(1+ζ)bT∗
“
ζ+ 1
ǫcc
− 1
ǫℓc
” (49)
When dk = 0, consider the factor-price frontier (4). Solving for w0 gives:
w0 =
a10p1(β−α)
bα
(50)
Equations (41) and (50) then imply
1
w0
dw0
dp1
= −αp1(β−α)
Therefore, considering (44) we derive:
dℓ
dp1
=
ℓ∗
p∗
1
2
4a01(Z1+Z2)
„
ζ+ 1ǫcc
−
1
ǫℓc
«
(1+ζ)bT∗
− α
β−α
3
5
1
ǫℓℓ
− 1
ǫcℓ
+
a11
(1+ζ)bT∗
“
ζ+ 1
ǫcc
− 1
ǫℓc
” (51)
Consider then a linearly homogeneous utility function U(c,L/B) and assume first that α 6= β.
Substituting (21), (42), (44), (47), (48), (49) and (51) into (31) finally gives:
D = −
2
4 θ[δ(1−β)+ρ(1−α)]
(1−θ)2ǫccΦ
+
[δ(1−β)+ρ](1−α)
„
ζ+ 1
(1−θ)ǫcc
«
(1+ζ)a00T
∗
3
5 (δ+ρ)(1−β)
(β−α)2
θ
(1−θ)2ǫccΦ
+
a11
»
ζβ+
β−θα
(1−θ)ǫcc
–
(1+ζ)b(β−α)T∗
+
ζθ2[a01κ
∗(1−α)+a11α]
(1+ζ)(1−θ)2ǫccb(β−α)T∗Φ
+ θα
(1−θ)ǫcc(β−α)Φ
T =
ρθ
(1−θ)2ǫccΦ
+
ζβ2ρ+
β2ρ−θα[δ(1−β)+ρ]
(1−θ)ǫcc
(1+ζ)(δ+ρ)b(β−α)T∗
−
ζθ2δ[a01κ
∗(1−β)+a11α]
(1+ζ)(1−θ)2ǫccb(β−α)T∗Φ
+ θα[δ(1−β)+ρ(1−α)]
(1−θ)ǫcc(β−α)2Φ
θ
(1−θ)2ǫccΦ
+
a11
»
ζβ+
β−θα
(1−θ)ǫcc
–
(1+ζ)b(β−α)T∗
+
ζθ2[a01κ
∗(1−α)+a11α]
(1+ζ)(1−θ)2ǫccb(β−α)T∗Φ
+ θα
(1−θ)ǫcc(β−α)Φ
(52)
It is worth noting at this point that (β − α)b > 0.
Note first that when θ = 0 we get
D = − [δ(1−β)+ρ](1−α)(δ+ρ)(1−β)ba00a11β(β−α) < 0 (53)
and saddle-point stability always holds. Consider now the denominator of D and T . Since
ζ = τ(η − 1)/(1 + τ), this expression is negative if and only if
θb(β−θα)
ǫccΦ
+ a11(1−θ)(β−θα)ǫccT ∗ < τ
{
(1−θ)a11 [β(1−θ)ǫcc−(β−θα)]
ǫccT ∗
+ θ
2[a01κ∗(1−α)+a11α]
ǫccΦT ∗
− η
[
θb(β−θα)
ǫccΦ
+ β(1−θ)
2a11
T ∗ +
θ2[a01κ∗(1−α)+a11α]
ǫccΦT ∗
]}
Obviously, there exists θ1 ∈ (0, 1) such that the right-hand side of this inequality is positive when
θ ∈ (θ1, 1), or equivalently, the denominator of D and T is negative if θ ∈ (θ1, 1) and
τ >
θb(β−θα)
ǫccΦ
+
a11(1−θ)(β−θα)
ǫccT∗
(1−θ)a11[β(1−θ)ǫcc−(β−θα)]
ǫccT∗
+
θ2[a01κ
∗(1−α)+a11α]
ǫccΦT∗
−η
h
θb(β−θα)
ǫccΦ
+
β(1−θ)2a11
T∗
+
θ2[a01κ
∗(1−α)+a11α]
ǫccΦT∗
i ≡ τ˜
Moreover, in the limit case θ = 1 we find
D = −
[δ(1−β)+ρ(1−α)](δ+ρ)(1−β)
(β−α)2
1+
ζ[a01κ
∗(1−α)+a11α]
(1+ζ)b(β−α)T∗
and T =
ρ−
ζδ[a01κ
∗(1−β)+a11α]
(1+ζ)b(β−α)T∗
1+
ζ[a01κ
∗(1−α)+a11α]
(1+ζ)b(β−α)T∗
(54)
Therefore, there exists θ2 ∈ [θ1, 1) such that D > 0, T < 0 and thus the NSS is locally indeter-
minate if θ ∈ (θ2, 1) and τ > τ˜ .
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Consider now the limit case α = β. We derive from (52):
lim
β→α
D = −
2
4 θ(δ+ρ)(1−β)
(1−θ)2ǫccΦ
+
[δ(1−β)+ρ](1−β)
„
ζ+ 1
(1−θ)ǫcc
«
(1+ζ)a00T
∗
3
5a00
a11β(ζ+ 1ǫcc )
(1+ζ)T∗
+
ζθ2[a01κ
∗(1−β)+a11β]
(1+ζ)(1−θ)2ǫccT∗Φ
lim
β→α
T =
ζβ2ρ+
β2ρ−θβ[δ(1−β)+ρ]
(1−θ)ǫcc
(1+ζ)(δ+ρ)T∗
−
ζθ2δ[a01κ
∗(1−β)+a11β]
(1+ζ)(1−θ)2ǫccT∗Φ
+
θβa00
(1−θ)ǫccΦ
a11β(ζ+ 1ǫcc )
(1+ζ)T∗
+
ζθ2[a01κ
∗(1−β)+a11β]
(1+ζ)(1−θ)2ǫccT∗Φ
(55)
When θ = 0 we get D < 0. We also easily derive
lim
β→α
τ˜ =
a11β(1−θ)
2
ǫcc
β(1−θ)2a11
h
1−η− 1
ǫcc
i
+(1−η)
θ2[a01κ
∗(1−α)+a11α]
ǫccΦ
Obviously, there exists θ3 ∈ (0, 1) such that limβ→α τ˜ > 0 when θ ∈ (θ
3, 1). Moreover, in the
limit case θ = 1 we find
lim
β→α
D = − (δ+ρ)(1−β))a00ζ[a01κ∗(1−β)+a11β]
(1+ζ)T∗
and lim
β→α
T = −δ (56)
with limβ→α τ˜ = 0. Therefore, there exist θ
4 ∈ (0, 1) such that the NSS is locally indeterminate
if θ ∈ (θ4, 1) and τ > limβ→α τ˜ . The result follows considering θ = max{θ
1, θ2, θ3, θ4} and τ = τ˜ .
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